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Abstract: Can the stock market be used to determine the political preferences of individual 
economic sectors? This paper explores the conceptual relationship between electoral outcomes and 
financial markets in Mexico. Specifically, it analyzes how financial markets predict the expected 
effects of a given political platform on the performance of firms within specific sectors. To do this, 
the study used event-study methodology to calculate abnormal returns on stock prices across the 
nine sectors listed on the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores stock exchange following the historic election 
of leftist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), On July 1, 2018. However, despite 
the uncertainty generated by the business unfriendly and anti-establishment rhetoric of AMLO as 
a candidate, the study was unable to definitively ascribe political preferences to firms at the sectoral 
level. Despite the lack of support for this hypothesis, the results do provide interesting information 
that can provide the basis for further study. 
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1. Introduction  
Studies from economics and other social sciences have long recognized that political and 
economic outcomes are highly correlated (albeit endogenously). These two fundamental aspects 
of human society have existed in tandem since the first organization of humans into cohesive 
political and economic units and remain the focal points of interest for those who endeavor to 
study the nature of human interactions. In the modern day, it has become possible to perform 
empirical analyses and experiments that quantify these interactions via the advent of easily 
measurable indicators such as stock market returns (as used in this study), interest and exchange 
rates, income levels, democratic political outcomes and many more. Within that context, this 
project focused on how fluctuations in firm values on the stock market can be linked to specific 
political outcomes in an attempt to determine the political preferences associated with individual 
economic sectors.  
To do this, this project calculated Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs, later 
referred to as ARs for brevity) using event-study methodology with the goal of determining how 
investors in the nine sectors listed on the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores stock exchange viewed the 
election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). The aim of these measurements and 
calculations was to quantify the predictions of investors on the potential effects of AMLO’s 
controversial brand of leftist politics in particular economic sectors in a country long-dominated 
by more centrist and business friendly political factions. To do so, this study used six different 
event windows over three important dates around and during the official campaign season:1 the 
end of intra-party primaries, the first day of the official campaign season (which is enforced by 
the government and prohibits campaign activities outside of specific dates) and the election itself. 
The use of six event windows is important because each gives a different perspective on the 
interpretation of ARs, with windows looking results prior to the event to take into account 
reductions in uncertainty and windows looking into the future taking into account market 
adjustments and long-term changes to firms’ stock prices. 
To perform this event-study analysis, abnormal returns will be calculated using the 
methodology developed by Pacicco, Vena and Venegoni (2018). The use of this methodology is 
worth noting because it represents the culmination of previously proposed event-study 
methodologies and provides model flexibility for utilizing different theoretical approaches and 
                                                          
1 Which is specified and enforced by the government, with no campaigning activities permitted outside of their 
pre-established window. 
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diagnostic tests. Furthermore, its replicable structure makes the results for each date under 
consideration comparable to one another, which makes tracking the individual preferences of 
sectors and individual firms easier to manage.  
 This study predicted that certain economic sectors would have strong political 
preferences based upon the potential effects that the political platforms of each candidate would 
have on their particular industries. We considered factors such as trade dependency, the 
beneficiaries of state-involvement in the economy and the sale of luxury items as the basis for 
predicting how certain sectors would regard the election of AMLO, who is widely considered to 
be a far-left of center politician suspicious of free-trade and hostile to the economic elite (The 
Economist, 2018; Krupskaia, 2018). Unfortunately, the study was unable to definitively 
determine the political preferences of entire sectors using this methodology alone, but did 
uncover some interesting statistical evidence that suggest the analysis could be reformulated at 
the individual firm level using the same data and results but adjusting the assumptions used in 
this present work. 
 
Background and Political Context 
 
Because the candidates from the opposition National Action Party won the presidency in 
2000 and 2006, the election of AMLO is technically not the first disruption to the otherwise 
stable political order, which had previously been dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) for 80 uninterrupted years. Following the relatively brief period of PAN leadership 
between 2000-2012, the following two presidential elections were won by the PRI and the 
MORENA (AMLO) candidates in 2012 and 2018 respectively. Thus, the return to power of the 
PRI between 2012-2016 represented a return to the old system of politics and economic policy. 
The perception by the electorate of the failure of the PRI to deliver on campaign promises and 
improve the country’s economic well-being (as well as numerous political scandals at the highest 
levels of power) led to a powerful backlash amongst voters, who rallied around AMLO and his 
promises of drastic changes to the political and economic systems of the country.  
Furthermore, the current President, AMLO, took part in the last three electoral cycles, 
losing in all but the most recent. This is important because over that time period he was labeled 
by the press and his political rivals as a radical leftist candidate akin to Hugo Chavez in Venezuela 
and Fidel Castro in Cuba (The Economist, 2018; Montes, 2018). Whether or not this vilification 
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of his candidacy has any merit, economic and political analysts generally framed him as an anti-
business candidate who would potentially nationalize many important industries and bring back 
state-management of the economy rather than free-market practices. His emphasis on economic 
inequality and social spending for Mexico’s large impoverished population also generated fears 
among investors about the safety of their property rights and ability to continue with business 
as usual (Montes, 2018). Both of these points are important because, regardless of their veracity, 
this was the information that was widely disseminated to investors and the general public during 
the electoral process. 
The qualities of AMLO as a candidate are crucial to the analysis presented by this project 
because they represent, at least superficially, a political force diametrically opposed to the general 
principles espoused by commercial interests and financial markets. Therefore, upon his election, 
we would expect the markets to demonstrate abnormal behavior due to his unapologetic populist 
and leftist political and economic philosophies. Furthermore, as his principle campaign promise 
was to challenge institutional corruption, would also suggest that the well documented illicit 
relationships between firms and public officials would be fundamentally threatened by his victory 
(Rosas, 2018)  This uncertainty and fear of his candidacy should in turn be reflected in firm’s 
stock prices as investors consider the potential threat to their investments. 
 
Underlying Assumptions in this Study  
 
Due to the unique characteristics of Mexico as a country and political system as well as 
for interpreting the results of the event studies featured in this study, the following major 
assumptions are made in the interpretation of the results of this analysis: 
• Andrés Manuel López Obrador represents the antithesis of the political and economic 
establishment. As a self-proclaimed leftist and outspoken skeptic of globalization and 
modern capitalism, AMLO is expected to cause an overall decline in sectors and firms 
that have benefited from past presidencies under the PAN and PRI political parties (The 
Economist, 2018; Montes, 2018; The Wall Street Journal, 2018). Therefore, an 
AMLO/MORENA victory would represent the first time that a president outside of the 
two preeminent political parties would have occupied the presidency. This would likely 
have major implications for firms with historical relationships with PAN and PRI political 
operatives (including through corruption) as well as the fact that his personal politics 
might provoke concern across the market about the new overall direction of Mexican 
economic policy. 
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• In many respects, we can expect the presence of abnormal returns to be the result of 
the reevaluation of the well documented corrupt relationships that have existed under 
the PRI and PAN governments of the past. Corruption is rampant and well documented 
in Mexico. This has been particularly evident under the previous administration of 
Enrique Peña Nieto, which suffered from corruption scandals at the highest levels of the 
government—including the president himself (Verza, 2018). In Mexico, corruption is 
often seen as a cost of doing business—required to get through the glacial bureaucracy 
and ensure the continuity of business operations. Thus, in many ways, measuring the 
political connectedness and preferences of firms acts as a proxy for estimating the 
presence of illicit relationships between government actors and firms. Therefore, it can 
be assumed that many of the largest firms in the country have spent decades cultivating 
power and influence amongst these two traditional political power-brokers. 
 
• For a myriad of reasons, including weak economic growth, rampant corruption and 
social exclusion, the Mexican electorate is expected to elect AMLO to the presidency. 
This is an important assumption in this study because of the nature of financial markets 
to adapt themselves to changing contexts and price-in new developments as uncertainty 
decreases. This is particularly important for calculating abnormal returns via event-
studies because abnormal returns are usually the result of unanticipated news and the 
sudden generation of uncertainty. For this study, knowing that AMLO is came into the 
presidential campaign with sizeable political support and that his opponents (PAN and 
PRI) are likely to split any vote in opposition to his candidacy, it is likely that markets 
will adjust accordingly and will take steps over time to adjust to the possibility of an 
AMLO victory—limiting the size of abnormal returns reported on the date of the election 
(Bloomberg, 2018). For this reason, this analysis will use multiple event-studies and 
windows over the duration of the campaign season. However, in light of Mexican political 
history fears of election irregularities and AMLO’s previous electoral loss by less than a 
percentage point will ensure that investor uncertainty remains a factor until the day of 
the election. 
 
• Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) data will differ by sector. Much of the 
fearmongering and negative rhetoric directed at front-runner candidate AMLO is focused 
upon his alleged adherence to a leftist ideology often referred to as “Venezuelan-Style 
Socialism (The Economist, 2018).” While these fears may or may not be founded in 
reality, the plethora of propaganda expressing this type of sentiment have the ability to 
affect the perspectives of investors who fear the deterioration of property rights as well 
as the introduction of policy more akin to a state-planned economy. For this reason, it is 
likely that abnormal returns (positive or negative) will likely reflect this expectation by 
investors.  
 
 
2. Literature Review  
The following sections aim to provide information about the main strategies and 
theoretical basis for analyzing the political preferences of firms operating in Mexico. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the primary methods of analysis rely on well-known event-study 
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and time series regression estimation models, which have been firmly established in the literature 
for several decades. That being said, inferences made from the study’s results are subject to the 
same limitations faced by all financial econometrics projects. This is due to the unobservable 
nature of many of the relationships between electoral and economic outcomes (such as propensity 
to vote or time-invariant personal traits that guide electoral decisions) and the difficulty and 
debate over their precise definition.  
However, as will now be shown, several attempts have already been made to 
mathematically identify both how stock prices react to political outcomes as well as how financial 
markets behave in the presence of institutional corruption. These strategies will form the basis 
for the analysis performed in this present project, which in of itself will essentially be a hybrid 
model combining the most important econometric techniques of each incorporated within event-
study methodology. 
 
2.1 Financial Time Series Data Analysis & Event Studies 
 
 The primary underlying theory for this project can be found in the practical use of 
financial time series data in the construction of an event-study analysis. In order to achieve 
results with minimal bias and which also provide tractable information for policy makers or 
academics, the model must be properly designed and specified. Thankfully, the econometric 
theory behind event studies using time series data has a relatively long history of academic 
attention and thus the foundational approaches to these methods have been well documented. 
  
2.1.1 The Theory Behind Event Studies 
 
In 1985, Stephen Brown and Jerold B. Warner released a manual in the Journal of 
Financial Economics in which they set forth the specific process by which individual daily stock 
returns can be analyzed under this event-study framework (Brown, Stephen J and Jerold B 
Warner, 1985). This specific focus on the use of daily stock returns as a data source is important 
for this present project as this particular type of data can produce results with substantially 
different inferences depending upon the construction of the model. For example, this paper 
specifically compares how daily returns differ from monthly returns in terms of departures from 
normality (daily returns often take the form of fat-tailed density distributions, rather than 
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normal) and an overall increase in the observed variance that can complicate the interpretation 
of the results when analyzing a specific time window during a study. They also address the 
increased power of autocorrelation on the overall results as there is a greater propensity for the 
value of individual stocks to be directly affected by previous values, which as mentioned above 
show a greater amount of overall variance compared with higher-level time variables such as 
monthly return data. 
 In later years, the literature began to focus more intensively on specific nuances in the 
structure of financial time series data and the irregularities associated with autocorrelation and 
non-stationarity of the error term. For example, a more recent proposal to account for serial 
correlation and irregularity is through the use of an approximate entropy technique, which is an 
outside-of-the-model approach to measure sequential departures from normality (Pincus and 
Kalman, 2004). The focus on normality is crucial for the proper functioning of event studies 
because if the stock-return data used does not have a normal distribution it skews the results, 
which tends to be the case more often than not with financial time series data. Fortunately, the 
lack of normality can be accounted for by specifying the type of diagnostic statistic (used to 
calculate standard errors) to determine the extra volatility within the structure of ARs, which 
accounts for non-normal distributions. 
This project will use the “estudy” command on STATA which is a user-created command 
authored by Fausto, Vena and Venegoni and published in the STATA journal in 2018. The 
command itself simplifies the process of calculating Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal returns 
over a maximum of six different event windows and provides several options for calculating the 
returns with different market models and statistical significance tests. (For more detail see 
Appendix C). 
 
2.2 The Political Preferences of Firms 
 
 One of the key factors for the analysis of financial market outcomes following the 2018 
Mexican presidential election will be the ability to link individual sectors to political party 
preferences using stock price returns as the primary indicator. Fortunately, there is a fairly large 
body of literature that provides examples and strategies for how to perform these types of 
analyses. 
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 One of the best examples of how to link political outcomes to firm value can be found in 
the work of Acemoglu et al (2015). This study showed a realistic approach to establishing a 
quantitative link between political and financial market outcomes utilizing event study 
methodology. The stock returns of firms that had an established direct or indirect association 
with Timothy Geithner when he was nominated to be Secretary of the Treasury by President 
Barrack Obama were found to have statistically significant abnormal returns when new 
information on the likelihood of his nomination was released. Because Geithner had worked for 
several years as the head of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, he was in constant 
communication with some of the largest financial firms in the country and had direct professional 
relationships with them as determined by public records of his meetings and correspondence 
(Acemoglu et al, 2016). To do this the authors analyzed cumulative abnormal returns for the 
firms sampled following the announcement of his nomination as well as when his nomination 
was almost derailed by a potential tax problem he had. By choosing these dates for their event-
study they were able to prove that indeed, those firms with personal and professional associations 
with Geithner saw a bump in their stock prices when his political future changed (Ibid). 
 Another important example of this type of event-study analysis comes from the work of 
Raymond Fisman, who analyzed the value of political connections by looking at firms in 
Indonesia under strong-man Suharto to measure how his perceived political longevity would 
affect firms assumed to have strong connections to him. This connectivity of firms to Suharto 
was done through identifying rumors and anecdotal evidence about the nation’s leader and then 
analyzing the stock prices of firms before and after this information became public. For example, 
when there were rumors about potential threats to Suharto’s health, certain firms had 
consistently similar declines in value compared with other firms considered less-well connected 
(Fisman, 2001). This analysis was then run for various types of similar political events with the 
firms identified as well-connected having statistically significant fluctuations in value consistent 
with Fisman’s hypothesis (Ibid).  
 In a similar fashion, the idea of volatility has been directly applied to political outcomes. 
While it is generally accepted that political instability would have these types of negative 
financial market outcomes, by looking at different countries with disparate levels of institutional 
quality and proving its universality statistically, the concept can be applied to broader contexts 
(Hira, 2017). Because the election of Vicente Fox (PAN) in 2000 and of Andrés Manuel López 
Obrador (MORENA) in 2018 represented a massive shift in the political order (The PRI political 
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party ruled the country uninterrupted for 80 years), these elections inherently represented 
moments of political instability and uncertainty. Thus, by using Hira’s results as a baseline for 
understanding how political instability can affect firm value, it can also be inferred that in the 
context of Mexico, volatility in stock prices in the face of a profound electoral change can be 
interpreted as a political preference for a political party or platform—be that positive or negative. 
 Indeed, some firms may have a greater sensitivity to political risk than others which are 
then reflected in their stock prices. For example, local and global political risks affect individual 
firms and sectors differently. There is evidence showing that industries more dependent on trade, 
contract enforcement and labor face greater return volatility in the presence of greater local 
political risk, with similar effects occurring when these risks occur in major trading partners 
(Boutchkova et al, 2012). This is important to the analysis of Mexican presidential elections 
because the various political parties in the country have very distinct political ideologies and 
economic philosophies—ranging from far-left to far-right—and these differences could be 
reflected in the prices of firms which could be perceived to benefit or lose under the rule of a 
given party. Furthermore, Mexico’s economy has many of the features mentioned by the authors: 
a heavy reliance on labor and international trade, as well as relatively weak property rights and 
pervasive institutional corruption that can threaten the enforcement of contracts (Ibid).  
 From a more simplistic perspective, it may be possible to judge how “business-friendly” a 
given political party or candidate is by monitoring the number of IPOs that occur in a country 
given the expectation that one or the other political group is likely to win an election (Çolak et 
al, 2017). In one study,” Çolak et al, analyzed the number of IPOs in individual States in the USA 
in years when they are to hold a gubernatorial election. Using bordering states who are not 
holding elections as a control group, they were able to find that the political uncertainty of a 
given election year has a dampening effect on the number of IPOs in a given jurisdiction (Çolak 
et al, 2017). This was particularly true for companies whose home states had higher 
concentrations of businesses and firms with greater dependence on government contracts (Ibid). 
While this particular methodology will not be used in this paper, it does demonstrate that using 
empirical methods to measure financial outcomes can be directly linked to political outcomes and 
that these results are quantifiable using econometrics. This is important for the analysis in 
Mexico because many firms in the country are either outrightly state-owned or have the 
government as a major stakeholder. Thus, a change in power could be seen as a threat to the 
operation of these firms and subsequently their overall value on the market. Therefore, a drop in 
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IPOs (or in the case of this project—abnormal returns data) might theoretically be correlated 
with the uncertainty of firms about the policies of a presumptive new president of the republic. 
 
2.3 Corruption  
 
One of the major assumptions (discussed later in this section) made within the framework 
of this project, is that institutional corruption is rampant in the Mexican political and economic 
systems—so much so, that abnormal returns for firms can be taken to be a direct result of radical 
changes in the structure that supported these illicit relationships. This aspect of the paper is 
necessarily more difficult to quantify due to the covert nature of illicit relationships. However, 
due to the well documented presence of corruption in the country (Naim, 2005; Rosas, 2018) as 
well as the lack of political variability in the country over the past 100 years, it is likely that a 
major political change would disrupt longstanding relationships between government and 
business which would result in a change in the value of those firms as a result of the loss of these 
valuable relationships. 
 One way to consider the problem of corruption in a middle-income country with fairly 
weak institutions such as Mexico is to first look at how corruption affects economic outcomes in 
more developed countries with greater institutional capacity. The work of Jared Smith (2016) 
provides an interesting insight into what to look for in Mexico. His findings, using data from the 
US Department of Justice, are that firms in more corrupt areas hold less cash and have greater 
leverage than firms in less corrupt areas (Smith, 2016). What this entails is that lower levels of 
cash and higher debt ratios are used a defensive mechanism to avoid expropriation by corrupt 
government officials (Ibid). This is important to the present analysis because these same 
underlying processes will likely show up in abnormal returns as firms reconsider the composition 
of their balance sheets. 
 From the perspective of the firm, Pat Akey (2016) shows that firms who donate money to 
winning political candidates tend to see an abnormal equity return approximately 3% higher than 
firms that did not (Akey, 2015). Within the context of US congressional elections, this study 
demonstrates that firms truly do have political preferences and that by donating to winning 
candidates they are able to establish a political network that will, more often than not, act in their 
favor on legislation important to the firm (Ibid). This same underlying logic was the foundation 
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for this analysis as it does empirically demonstrate that economic interests have certain political 
preferences and that when they attain them, they benefit materially. 
 
3. Data &Methodology  
 
3.1 The Data  
 
All of the data utilized by this project is derived from the Bloomberg Professional Services 
platform available at terminals provided by the University of San Francisco at their 101 Howard 
Street Campus. The total dataset is composed of 57 firm securities listed on the Bolsa Mexicana 
de Valores (BMV) stock exchange, with daily stock prices for each between January 1, 2017 and 
December 31, 2018 for a total of 502 observations for each firm. The decision to use two years of 
data was based upon the study “The Value of Connections in Turbulent Times: Evidence from 
the United States” by Acemoglu et. al., in which the authors calculated their event-study 
estimation window by using 250 trading days of data prior to the events under question. This 
study does not follow their formula precisely because several important dates during the 2018 
campaign cycle make the estimation windows for earlier events slightly smaller than those that 
come after. However, all of the estimation windows utilized comprise at least one year’s worth of 
data, which the Acemoglu study specifically mentioned as an important barometer for calculating 
abnormal returns (ARs; which are discussed later in this section). The sample size would have 
been far larger than 57—there are a total of 145 firms listed on the exchange at the time this 
project was undertaken—but for unknown reasons, Bloomberg is missing data for many of the 
listed firms, in various degrees of severity. However, while the Bloomberg data obtained is flawed 
in terms of its completeness and accessibility to information for all firms listed on the BMV 
exchange, it remains a respected and widely used source of financial information across the 
world—and as such—where complete information is available it can be considered a trustworthy 
and verified source for the financial data used in this present project. 
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3.1.1 The Sample 
 
The sample was restricted to those firms for which complete information was available 
through the dates under analysis, (with a few exceptions) for a total of 57 securities across all 
nine sectors listed by the BMV2. It should be noted, however, that only one firm represents the 
entirety of four individual sectors—predominantly because of missing data in the Bloomberg 
network but also because only one firm currently exists in the information technology sector.  
In the case of five firms, the problem of missing data was relatively minor (less than 12 
observations out of 502) and these missing data points were then imputed by taking the 
geometric average, which is the square root of the product of the price before the missing 
observation and the price after the missing observation. This method of imputing the data was 
utilized in order to preserve as large a sample as possible without polluting the data with too 
many daily price estimations that could potentially lower the accuracy of the results or which do 
not reflect the true values of the data. Furthermore, the additional firms listed on Bloomberg 
with missing data have a much larger incidence of missing observations ranging from 25%-80%. 
This study considers this large figure of missing values inadmissible for data imputing due to 
firm-specific fluctuations in market price which would likely lead to inaccurate estimations of 
firm value at any given time. I believe these concerns also become more problematic with less 
data available to make the proper imputations.  
 
3.1.2 The BMV and the S&P/BM V IPC 
 
 An important aspect of this study with implications on the overall results is the 
composition and behavior of the S&P/BMV IPC index which is used as an approximate measure 
of the BMV’s overall performance and which, in this study, was used to calculate abnormal 
returns for each firm. The index is designed to give a broad measure of the equities market by 
indexing the largest and most liquid stocks listed on the exchange. The firms are then weighted 
using a capitalization-weighted index (CWI), which is subject to diversification requirements to 
ensure the index accurately encompasses the overall performance of the market across sectors 
                                                          
2 The nine sectors utilized by the BMV exchange are: Energy, Industrials, Materials, Consumer Staples, Health Care, 
Telecommunications Services, Financial Services, Consumer Discretionary and Services and Information 
Technology. 
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(Bloomberg.com, 2019; BMV.com, 2019). As of April 30, 2019, the index consists of 35 firms, of 
which 28 appear in this analysis. This is an important point because as these firms have been 
chosen based on their capitalization share, their presence in the analysis (28/57 securities) will 
likely outweigh may of the other smaller and more illiquid firms and skew the abnormal return 
readings by sector towards the overall index return outcomes. Therefore, the volatility of the 
S&P/BMV IPC was an important factor for understanding the abnormal return outcomes for 
individual firms and sectors. It also played a role in inference in the sense that, knowing the 
analysis was weighted heavily towards the index results allows a determination to be made about 
the political preferences of the largest firms in the country and their expectations about the 
outcome of the 2018 election. 
   
3.1.3 Sample Selection 
 
 Because there are so many firms for which information is missing in the Bloomberg 
system, it is worth discussing how the sample selection may have influenced the results of this 
study. From the data of the 114/145 firms whose daily closing prices are available for download 
on Bloomberg Professional Services, there are some noticeable differences in the trading 
characteristics of the firms in the sample (57/145) versus those that were not included. One of 
the primary findings is that the grand majority of firms with large amounts of missing data also 
had overall low share-value and market capitalization when compared to the 35 firms that 
compose the S&P/BMV IPC index. For example, for the logistical services firm Accel 
(ACCELSAB), between March 2 and November 30, 2018 only 34 daily closing prices are available 
and they show a very modest increase in value from 10.31MXN to 14.20MXN (USD $0.54.-
$0.74). While this is a significant gain in terms of percentage increase, it remains miniscule in 
terms of market capitalization weight (the 35 firms composing the S&P/BMV IPC have share 
prices three to thirty times greater than Accel). 
In addition, many of these firms showed very little change in value over long periods of 
time, indicating that the missing values from Bloomberg may have resulted from an overall lack 
of activity by a given firm on the market, which in turn may have led Bloomberg to eliminate the 
redundant data points in the interest of conciseness. The Accel example used above also applies 
under this scenario: the increase of slightly less than four pesos over 8 months appears to have 
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been very gradual and many of the available data points show the same value on consecutive 
observations. 
 Regardless of the reason for the discrepancy in available data provided by Bloomberg for 
many of the firms listed on the exchange, the lack of daily closing price information from this 
source necessitated their removal from the sample as the calculation of abnormal returns would 
then be inconsistent over time and across firms. However, the smaller sample also provides 
problems with inference as it becomes more difficult to determine if smaller or less-volatile firms 
were affected in the same way as the sample firms that provide full information. This is 
particularly true due to the large percentage of firms in the sample that also compose the 
S&P/BMV IPC index. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
In order to calculate the political preferences and connectedness of firms, this study 
utilized event-study methodology to calculate the abnormal returns to firms’ stock prices during 
certain events of significance during the 2018 Mexican General Election that had the likely 
potential to affect financial markets. Specifically, this study will rely upon the new (2018) event-
study methodology developed by Pacicco, Vena and Venegoni and peer reviewed by the STATA 
Journal. This model will be used to analyze three key dates during the campaign process:  
Date: Electoral Significance: 
February 11, 2018 The completion of the intra-party primary election process. 
April 2, 2018 First day markets open after the official start to the campaign season. 
July 1, 2018 The day of the election itself. 
 
These three event windows were selected to determine whether new information 
(particularly polls and the expectations for the postulation and subsequent selection of 
candidates) affected the value of certain firms or sectors consistently over time. This will be 
determined by checking for abnormal returns (in this case Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns; CAARs) over six separate event windows surrounding the three selected dates of 
importance. The event windows will be consistent over the dates analyzed and each provides a 
slightly different perspective for interpreting the results.  
One important factor to keep in mind when analyzing the results from these six event 
windows is that due to the mathematical nature of calculating abnormal returns and the cross-
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correlation that occurs between firms and the market as a whole, the larger the event window, 
the less accurate the results tend to be. When there are too many factors involved over an 
extended period of time, it becomes difficult to distinguish the effects of overall market trends 
from the results of individual firms. Therefore, with the exception of two of these (used to analyze 
the extremes of both positive and negative CAARs), the event windows have been kept 
purposefully small in order to gain greater insight into the sudden fluctuations (positive or 
negative) of individual firms and sectors following specific events.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that the structure of the event windows can tell 
different stories based upon the time periods covered. The most obvious are the CAARs 
calculated following the event itself which measure how firms’ values fluctuate following the 
release of new information. While for the purposes of this study, these are the most valuable for 
inference, they suffer from previous knowledge and expectations of investors who may have 
predicted the outcome of an event and bought and sold securities accordingly. Thus, forward-
looking event-studies are best utilized to analyze unexpected information or events, as in the case 
of the Acemoglu et. al.’s study regarding the uncertain nomination of Timothy Geithner to the 
Secretary of the Treasury or in the case of Fisman’s study on the rumors to the health of 
Indonesian strongman Suharto. However, in many cases, information is leaked beforehand or is 
easily discernible from readily available information. This reduces uncertainty and allows 
investors to price-in events before they happen, which subsequently reduces the ability of event 
studies to pick up on abnormal returns. This present study analyzes firm value over the course 
of a hard-fought presidential campaign with constant media coverage and the regular release of 
opinion polls, so it is also necessary to look back in time in order to account for changes in the 
value of firms who have previously accounted for potential uncertainty. This is particularly true 
in the case of the Mexican General Election because the front-runner candidate, Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador, steadily increased his lead over his rivals in every poll from the beginning of the 
campaign season. Thus, despite documented expectations that many people and firms expected 
irregularities in the electoral process and possible corruption aimed at keeping AMLO out of 
office (Wall Street Journal, 2018; The Economist, 2018) uncertainty in the markets naturally 
decreased over time as it became clear who the winner would be. As such, this study also utilizes 
two event windows that take into account the days before an event occurred in order to try and 
capture the effects of investors changing expectations and their forecasts on market conditions. 
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The event windows used on each important date are as follows: 
Days 
Previous 
to Event 
Days 
Following 
the Event 
Reasoning Behind Specific Event Windows 
0 1 This will capture the immediate effects of abnormal returns 
following an event, without regard to previous market movements 
or future market adjustments. It is the primary window of interest. 
0 3 This window captures two additional days of market adjustments 
following the event in question 
0 10 This was borrowed from the methodology of Acemoglu et. al., in 
order to check whether abnormal changes were temporary or more 
permanent in nature by looking at the extremes of the event 
window. 
-3 3 This window will capture the cumulative effects of an event, taking 
into account both changing previous expectations and market 
adjustments after the fact. 
-5 1 This seeks to analyze the effect of potentially reduced uncertainty 
or changing expectations in the market a week prior to the event 
-10 1 Same as above but looks at two weeks of previous information 
rather than one. 
 
3.2.2 Hypotheses 
 
Null Hypothesis, H0: No abnormal returns will be registered following the election, or will be 
uncorrelated with political events and/or inconsistent by firm over the dates currently under 
analysis. 
 
Alternative Hypotheses, HA: AMLO’s victory, or the expectation thereof, will cause negative 
abnormal returns in firms that fear his political ideology and economic policies, while positive 
abnormal returns are expected for the firms likely to benefit from his victory. The specific 
hypotheses for this study can be found below. 
 
Within the context of Mexican democracy, Andrés Manuel López Obrador is a divisive 
candidate in many respects. He is one of the first to truly challenge the integrity of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which had ruled the executive branch of the country as 
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well as the majority of the congress (through coalitions) in the country uninterrupted for 71 
years. This ended only when, Vicente Fox (National Action Party; PAN), of the equally long-
lasting opposition, reached the presidency in the year 2000 and his successor of the same party, 
Felipe Calderón, in 2006. However, despite these PAN victories, their administrations tended to 
be criticized for not departing far enough from the political platforms of former PRI 
governments.  For this reason, the emergence of a new candidate and political party leaning 
heavily to the left of center and one who, in the previous electoral contest, lost by less than 1% 
of the vote, presented a threat to the established political order (Wall Street Journal, 2018; The 
Economist, 2018).  
Thus, in the interest of this study, the following hypotheses take these perceived radical 
changes into account: 
 
1) Firms in sectors with high trade dependency—particularly with the United States—will 
see negative returns in the event of an AMLO victory. 
 
Considering the rhetoric of both the candidate AMLO and that seen in Mexican and 
international news sources, sectors that depend heavily on international trade are predicted to 
decline in value (Boutchkova et al, 2012; Wall Street Journal 2018).  This is due to both the policy 
platforms proposed by AMLO as a candidate, as well as how they were interpreted by the 
international community, which have been described in several international news sources as 
“Venezuelan-Style Socialism.” In addition, AMLO’s own 2018 political platform expressly stated 
that his highest priorities are: 1) The market shall not replace the state; 2) for the well-being of 
all, the poor must come first.” (AMLO National Development Plan, 2018). This type of rhetoric 
has been interpreted by some to mean an implied threat to property rights, the ease of doing 
business, and the hostility towards the political and economic regimes of some of Mexico’s most 
important trading partners. The well-publicized reactions to this type of rhetoric, in addition to 
outside academic evidence, leads this study to hypothesize that firms in the Industrials, Materials, 
and Financial Services sectors will register negative abnormal returns in the event of AMLO’s 
victory. 
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2) Firms that provide luxury or consumer discretionary products will see negative returns. 
 
AMLO spent the majority of his last three presidential campaigns bringing attention to 
the conditions faced by the impoverished in Mexico (Villarreal, 2006). In a nation that has 
historically dealt with high levels of income inequality, poverty and classist social strife, the 
perception of a president hostile to the economic elite has caused an outpouring of public 
indignation from many well-known figures in the ultra-wealthy class, including threats to move 
themselves and their business interests from the country in the event of his election (Linthicum, 
2018). For this reason, this study predicts negative abnormal returns in the Consumer and 
Discretionary Services Sector, which includes the sale of luxury items and businesses related to 
tourism. 
 
3) Firms that provide consumer staples, infrastructure construction and maintenance and 
public goods can expect to benefit from government subsidies and contracts that will 
provoke positive abnormal returns. 
 
Despite many fears in the market about the potential effects of AMLO’s policies, there are 
certain firms and sectors which could be expected to gain under his administration. The rhetoric 
concerning the possible renationalization of important industries such as PEMEX in the energy 
sector (petroleum and natural gas and not listed on the BMV) and a return of public influence to 
economic planning could potentially benefit the providers of public goods—such as utilities and 
infrastructure providers—as well as consumer staples, which candidate AMLO has publicly 
endorsed as possible recipients for government subsidies (Villarreal, 2006; Linthicum, 2018). 
Furthermore, in November, 2018 AMLO’s incoming government proposed using coal as a way 
to decrease dependence on Electricity provided by the United States (Solis, 2018). His focus on 
the poor and emphasis on providing greater government services would indicate that private 
healthcare providers and consumer staples would also see a general increase in their stock value.  
Therefore, this study predicts that the Energy, Consumer Staples, Health Care, 
Telecommunications and Information Technology sectors will register positive abnormal 
returns in the event of AMLO’s victory. 
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3.2.3 Calculating Abnormal Returns (ARs) 
 
The formula for calculating returns is quite simple: 
 
Where Xt is the parameter of interest + the overall index return. 
  
• Alpha represents the parameter under consideration (firm)  
• Beta represents the estimate of the impact of the total market returns. 
However, simple abnormal returns are not sufficient for the purposes of this study due to the 
fact that the event-studies undertaken will analyze multi-day periods to account for reductions 
in uncertainty prior to the event, as well as delayed reactions in the market after the event. To 
capture these effects, Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated, which are simply the 
sum of abnormal returns over the period of time specified. 
In addition, because this study will analyze a group of firms, it will also be necessary to take 
a cross-sectional aggregation (the average) of the CARs in order to account the total effect of the 
events under study on the group of firms overall. These are known as Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Returns (CAARs): 
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4. Results  
 
4.1 Overall impressions 
 
The final results of this study are a mixed bag with many potential points of inference. In 
general, we fail to reject the null hypothesis on hypotheses one and three, with a mixed effect 
present in hypothesis two in which several firms demonstrate the opposite effect than was 
predicted by the study. The primary conclusion that we reach from these results is that 
determining the political preferences of firms in Mexico is not possible from a sectoral 
perspective. The reasons for this are varied and multi-faceted, but can be essentially explained 
by the fact that falling into a particular economic sector does not preclude the role of economic 
forces on each unique individual firm. For example, the idea of trade dependency was posited to 
affect certain sectors more than others on the basis of the products and services provided, but 
failed to take into account the supply chains and destination markets for goods and services in 
other sectors, which ultimately were also trade dependent (see explanation of hypothesis three).\ 
In addition, there is likely to be a certain degree of measurement error stemming from 
the incomplete data set due to the fact that the abnormal returns were calculated without more 
than half of all the listed firms and which is also based upon a heavily weighted baseline index. 
Furthermore, the operationalization of the AR variables within this methodological framework 
(e.g. using them as a proxy for sectoral political preferences) makes it difficult to determine 
whether the overall magnitude of a change or its statistical significance as an AR is more 
pertinent to understanding the political preferences of those firms. 
However, despite the failure of these hypotheses to capture a causal effect of politics on 
specific economic sectors, there is a good deal insight to be gained from these results that could 
potentially influence future projects and analyses. The fact that higher levels of analysis (sectors 
over individual firms) did not adequately capture political preferences as was hypothesized, in 
this case, the widely-cast net still managed to capture some interesting information outside of 
the scope of the sectoral analysis.  
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The following section will explain the results of this analysis in the following order: 
 
1) An analysis of the overall performance of the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores as 
determined by the S&P/BMV IPC index. This index was also used as the baseline 
value upon which the abnormal returns in this study were calculated. 
2) A discussion of the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns on the day of the election 
(July 1, 2018) of the firms in the sample will be described by sector as they relate to 
the three hypotheses presented earlier in this paper. 
3) A review of the robustness checks for the primary event date of interest (the election 
day), which were the two other milestone events during the official campaign season 
(end of intra-party primary elections and the official start to the legally mandated 
campaign season) will be reviewed for their consistency with the election day results.  
4) The presentation of the overall conclusion presented by the results of this study, 
theories for the discrepancies in the hypotheses and suggestions for further research. 
 
Primary event of interest—July 1, 2018. Mexican General Election 
 
An Overview of the Market as a Whole 
 
On Monday July 2, 2018, the markets opened for the first time following the election on 
the previous day (Sunday July 1, 2018) with fairly surprising results. One of the primary points 
of interest regarding the behavior of the BMV on that day is that, despite the rhetoric and fear 
of economic collapse propagated by AMLO’s opponents and widely disseminate in the media, the 
sample under evaluation in this project collectively had a miniscule and statistically insignificant 
positive reaction of 0.59%. In addition, a visual analysis of the S&P/BMV IPC shows that the 
uncertainty predicted by the hypotheses in this study are represented in an overall decline in the 
days leading up to the election, followed by a massive comeback in the days and months following 
the election of AMLO. It is important to mention that the market lost all of its gains, and fell to 
its lowest level in two years in the final months of 2018, which in many respects supports the 
underlying assumptions and hypotheses of this study, but which also fall outside of the time 
period under analysis and therefore cannot be considered within the interpretation of these 
results.  
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Furthermore, two weeks after his election (10 market days), the sample as a whole 
registered a 2.20% cumulative increase which was statistically significant at the 10% level. This 
indicates two important points that validate the underlying assumptions of this project. First, 
the negligible abnormal returns (at least initially) registered by the portfolio of firms in this 
sample following the largest general election in the history of the country (in terms of the number 
of executive and legislative seats contested)  radically shifted the political climate of the country, 
was expected by most firms for some time and had already been priced into their operating 
strategies. This demonstrates the value of looking backwards in time for abnormal returns when 
conducting event-study analyses where long-standing public information is available to 
investors. In this particular case, fears of electoral misconduct and a general mistrust of the 
federal government were enough to maintain a certain level of uncertainty amongst investors up 
until at least two weeks before the election—despite the abundance of polls predicting his victory 
(Council of Americas, 2018).  
Second, it demonstrates that AMLO’s actions and rhetoric on the campaign trail denying 
the imposition of a radically leftist “Hugo Chavez”-style government, were enough to quell the 
misgivings of investors (The Economist, 2018; Linthicum, 2018). Thus, positive abnormal 
returns in this case could represent market corrections after firm prices fell on initial fears of his 
policies. This view is supported by the (0,10) trading-day event window which fell on July 12, 
2018, the same day that AMLO met with United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and 
other officials of the Donald J. Trump administration in order to quell fears over trade and 
bilateral relations between the two nations (Krupskaia, 2018; LopezObrador.org, 2018). On that 
date, several more firms registered statistically significant abnormal returns, and others with 
non-statistically significant results saw their return estimations flip signs.  
In addition, when taking into account one to two weeks before the election, it appears that 
certain firms were affected by reduced political uncertainty amongst investors with many firms 
seeing large and statistically significant abnormal returns in the run-up to the event. 
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Results by Sector3 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms in sectors with high trade dependency—particularly with the United 
States—will see negative returns in the event of an AMLO victory (Industrials, Materials and 
Financial Services). 
 
Hypothesis 1 CAAR (0,1) CAAR (0,3) CAAR (0,10) CAAR (-3,3) CAAR (-5,1) CAAR (-10,1) 
Industrials 0.76% 1.51% 2.60% 1.52% 1.08% 1.15% 
Materials 0.73% -0.34% 1.84% 0.47% 1.02% 2.09% 
Financial Services 1.05% 2.60%** 4.88%** 0.86% -0.14% -1.28% 
 
The trade dependency hypothesis of the three sectors mentioned above resulted in the 
most surprising result in the study. Not only was it impossible to reject the null hypothesis of 
negative abnormal returns across the sectors hypothesized, but in fact, the opposite effect tended 
to be true across all event windows. 
  On the first trading day after the election, eight out of thirteen firms in the industrials 
sector registered positive returns (although only Aeromexico was statistically significant; at the 
1% level). While the statistical significance of these results is minimal, it is quite telling that these 
firms did not have the severe negative impact predicted by the study. In this case, the absence of 
negative statistically significant abnormal returns, disproves the theory that these trade-reliant 
firms would have been damaged by AMLO’s victory. Thus, their political preferences cannot be 
determined by the scope of this study although it is quite possible that anticipation of victory led 
them to take safeguard measures ahead of time that were not captured by these event windows. 
The hypothesis finds more support in the materials sector, where more negative returns 
were registered across the majority of firms. However, the overall lack of statistical significance 
and the differences between the firms in terms of their sub-sector designations make inference a 
difficult task. For example, the day after the election, two mining firms Industrias Peñoles 
(PEOLES) and Minera Autlán (AUTLANB), which would have been expected to come under 
greater scrutiny by the new administration in terms of fiscal contributions and human rights and 
environmental issues, saw abnormal returns at the 10% level of significance, negative in the case 
of the former (-4.46%) and positive in the latter (3.17%). It is therefore more likely that these 
                                                          
3 ***P-value < .01, **P-value < .05, *P-value <.1 
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returns demonstrate changing international market conditions for mining products or an 
internal change within the firm itself and not related to AMLO’s victory.  
The greatest surprise derived from these results is what occurred in the financial sector. 
The results suggest that major financial institutions in the country reacted positively to the 
election of AMLO, with statistically significant positive abnormal returns of 2.60% three days 
after the event at the 10% level and after 10 trading days the sample firms in this sector registered 
overall abnormal returns of 4.88% also at the 10% significance level. However, these results were 
driven by one firm in particular, Gentera, a bank which is specifically dedicated to helping the 
poor and providing credit to those usually outside of the traditional financial system. Thus, while 
the hypothesis was incorrect, it is consistent with the assumptions made by this study—that 
firms working for the benefit of the lower classes, in terms of investment and government 
interest, would see positive abnormal returns. In fact, Gentera saw positive and statistically 
significant returns in every event window used in this study—with both only past and only future 
results considered (see Appendix C). In addition, one of the largest banks in Mexico, Spain-based 
Santander, saw consistent losses up until the day of AMLO’s election, but began recovering 
(albeit statistically insignificantly), three days after and ended up with a positive 10.76% 
abnormal return after 10 trading days at the 1% level—the same day AMLO met with Secretary 
of State of the United States, Mike Pompeo. On that same day, Credito Real, a finance firm based 
in the City of Mexico, also registered a 10.89% abnormal return, significant at the 10% level. 
Thus, the initial results were favorable for financial firms engaged in financial markets directed 
towards the poor and following AMLO’s meeting with the Secretary of State of the United States, 
were beneficial to more traditional financial firms as well. 
Therefore, while the sectoral hypothesis was not sufficient to describe the political 
preference of individual firms by sector that were predicted by the study, the results are quite 
compelling and still fall within the boundaries of the initial assumptions of this analysis. 
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Hypothesis 2: Firms that provide luxury or consumer discretionary products will see negative 
abnormal returns. 
 
 
As in the case of trade-dependency, the sectoral analysis on the sale of luxury goods was 
not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis. However, at the level of individual firms there are 
some inferences to be made. Sare, a holding company for firms that work in the residential 
construction and sales business, saw a significant abnormal return (5.37%) at the 10% level. 
While the rest of the sector did not register significant changes neither by magnitude nor by 
statistical significance, the gains by this firm on the first trading day after the election could 
suggest that AMLO’s populist concern regarding the lack of adequate housing for the Mexican 
people (CONEVAL, 2018) resonated with investors who expected a further expansion of state-
financed/supported housing developments. However, Alsea, which is the parent company that 
holds franchises for fast-food and casual dining establishments, most of which are based in the 
United States, saw a decline in value (-2.37%) at the 10% level, which gives credence to the 
previous hypothesis of negative returns for trade dependent firms—albeit not in the sectoral 
sense predicted by this study. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Firms that provide consumer staples, infrastructure construction and 
maintenance and public goods can expect to benefit from government subsidies and contracts 
that will provoke positive abnormal returns (Energy, Consumer Staples, Health Care, 
Telecommunications and Information Technology sectors). 
 
Hypothesis 3 CAAR (0,1) CAAR (0,3) CAAR (0,10) CAAR (-3,3) CAAR (-5,1) CAAR (-10,1) 
Energy 0.84% 1.84% 1.50% 1.97% 2% 4.71% 
Consumer Staples 0.28% -0.37% 0.10% 1.03% 1.38% 2.6%* 
Healthcare -0.33% -1.18% -1.07% -2.50% -1.87% -1.62% 
Telecommunications -0.18% -2.11% -2.19% -2.16% -1.15% -2.72% 
Information 
Technology 
0.54% 0.09% -0.90% 0.85% 3.12% 3.80% 
Hypothesis 2 CAAR (0,1) CAAR (0,3) CAAR (0,10) CAAR (-3,3) CAAR (-5,1) CAAR (-10,1) 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Services 
0.27% -0.22% 3.09% -1.14% 0.64% -0.56% 
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As in the case of the previous two hypotheses, a sectoral analysis to determine the political 
preferences of firms is not possible with this sample and time period. However, as in the other 
hypotheses presented above, there are notable exceptions that merit discussion.  
First, and most importantly, the idea of trade dependence is once again proven to be 
independent of sectoral affiliation. Herdez, one of the most prolific brands of ready-to-eat and 
canned goods (such as salsas, chilies and beans) in Mexico and the United States, saw 
chronologically consistent negative returns across all event windows—with a negative 3.42% 
abnormal return (significant at the 5% level) registered on the day after the election. However, 
Herdez was merged with an equally ubiquitous American brand, Hormel, in 2009 and as such, is 
likely to have suffered from investor uncertainty about AMLO’s trade priorities with the United 
States. From the opposite side of the spectrum, the supermarket chain, La Comer—a 
domestically-based firm, (providing food, durable consumer products and other products and 
services) saw strong and statistically significant positive abnormal returns leading up to the 
election, with a cumulative abnormal return of 10% (at the 1% level) in the (-5,1) event window 
and a 11.02% (at the 5% level) cumulative return when taking into account an additional week 
before. However, despite a 6.29% (significant at the 1% level) positive abnormal return the day 
after the election, their returns dropped sharply, albeit without statistical significance, in the 
succeeding event windows. This example does provide support for the underlying reasoning 
behind the hypothesis, but was the exception to the rule in the context of the rest of the sector. 
It is also worth noting, that the Consumer Staples sector, which the hypotheses of this 
study hypothesized would benefit from the election of an individual whose rhetoric included the 
provision of subsidies to the poor for their basic needs—money that inevitably ends in the hands 
of the provider of those goods and services—showed some of the of the most lackluster results 
in terms of volatility. With the exception of the stand-out firms mentioned previously, the rest 
of the sample registered statistically insignificant returns of less than 2%. 
 
Robustness checks—April 2 and February 11, 2018 
 
The purpose of performing the same event-studies on these other significant days during 
the campaign process was to see whether the same firms reacted consistently at certain electoral 
milestones. Both of these events could be construed as beneficial to AMLO (he was officially 
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nominated as presidential candidate by his party on February 11 and polls indicated that he held 
a double digit lead over his opponents by the official opening of campaign season on March 30) 
and as such, the study expected firms to register ARs with the same sign as on the day of the 
election—confirming their political preferences one way or the other (Council of the Americas, 
2018). There were only three firms that met that criteria over all three windows: Volaris Airlines 
(VOLARA; Industrials), Minera Autlán (AUTLANB; Materials) and La Comer (LACOMBUC; 
Consumer Staples). All three of these firms registered positive ARs in event windows for the 
dates under analysis, but only La Comer’s ARs fit the hypotheses of the study. However, these 
results are instructional, as they could provide evidence of the political preferences of these firms 
outside of the sectoral context that is the focus of this study. Thus, they could form the basis for 
further research into the financial impact of this election as will be discussed in the conclusion. 
 Additionally, six other firms showed ARs consistent with their results during the election 
in at least one of the additional dates under analysis. Those firms were: Gentera (GENTERA, 
Financial Services), Grupo GICSA (GICSAB; Financial Services), Bolsa de Valores Mexicana 
(BOLSAA; Financial Services), Credito Real (CREAL; Financial Services), El Puerto de 
Liverpool (LIVEPOLC; Consumer and Discretionary) and Herdez (HERDEZ; Consumer 
Staples). However, further statistical analysis would be needed to confirm that these results were 
not simply coincidental, particularly given that most of these firms are in the Financial Services 
sector and therefore have correlated outcomes. Despite this, the results from these firms would 
provide a good starting point for further analysis using different statistical methodologies in a 
future investigation into the political preferences of firms in Mexico. 
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1. Summary and Conclusion 
In effect, none of the hypotheses posited here could be proven with statistical evidence. 
Despite that, this study has revealed unexpected information that could be utilized as the basis 
for future analysis. Determining firm political preferences based upon event-study methodology 
cannot be adequately determined at the sectoral level due to the heterogenous nature of the firms 
involved. Furthermore, such a generalization detracts from the true goal of analyzing how 
Mexican firms listed on the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores and their shareholders viewed what was 
widely considered a seminal moment in the political history of the country. There were also 
technical and statistical limitations that may have lent themselves to the failure to reject the three 
null hypotheses presented in this study. Notwithstanding those limitations, there is much to learn 
from this data: 
 
1) Despite the incorrect sectoral-based hypotheses, trade dependency was indeed an important 
factor in the distribution of returns. This study erroneously hypothesized that certain sectors 
would be universally affected by the election of a fire-brand leftist candidate. However, the 
results from this study suggest that was not the case. The concept of trade dependency, for 
example, appears to have inter-sectoral impacts, which are not exclusively determined by the 
sector they pertain to. The results did suggest that a few individual firms such as Volaris, 
Grupo Autlán and La Comer registered consistent abnormal terms across the three event 
windows studied—but again, these were not part of any discernable pattern amongst the 
other firms from the sample in their sector. 
 
2) The sample size was too small as a result of the incompleteness of the Bloomberg Professional 
Services database, which lacked full information for more than half of the listed firms with no 
explanation provided. Furthermore, due to the inexplicable segments of missing data 
provided by Bloomberg Professional Services, only that half of the listed firms on the BMV 
exchange with full information were utilized in this analysis, reducing both the power of the 
estimates and the ability to infer the accuracy of the hypotheses under study. However, the 
individual firm results did provide a basis for further analysis, and in fact, their AR calculation 
utilizing the BMV as the baseline would very likely be valid even in the presence of the 
additional autocorrelation that would have been present with additional firms in the sample—
given that the largest and most liquid firms are already included. 
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3) This election, though seminal, was widely predicted by opinion polls many months before 
July 1, 2018—limiting the effectiveness of event-study methodology which relies on new (and 
generally unexpected) information in the presence of uncertainty. Thus, while the hypotheses 
in this study were formulated nearly a year prior to the election, when the outcome was less 
certain, over time the opinion polls tracking voting preferences universally demonstrated a 
definitive advantage for AMLO (Council of the Americas, 2018). Several months before the 
election date, AMLO held a double-digit advantage over his opponents—a difference that 
continued to increase as time went on. Therefore, in all likelihood the market had already 
priced in the potential benefits or damages that his election could pose to firms in advance 
and were therefore less likely to register abnormal changes in value during the event itself.  
 
4) The firms that did demonstrate abnormal returns, both positive and negative, exhibit certain 
characteristics that can be retrospectively inferred to be related to the assumptions and 
hypotheses presented by this study, laying the foundation for future analysis. For example, 
Aeromexico, the largest Mexican airline and formerly a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) saw 
a positive and statistically significant abnormal return after the election, suggesting a 
possible political preference of these types of firms (Until the 1980s-1990s, there were nearly 
a 1000 SOEs) that could potentially benefit from a government interested in taking more 
direct control over economic planning. Therefore, an analysis at the firm level takes into 
account the assumption utilized by this study regarding AMLO’s views on free-market 
capitalism, while providing a more nuanced lens of analysis than a purely sectoral analysis 
could provide. Another potential method for future analysis could focus on one sector in 
particular, such as the financial sector which provided surprising results in this study. 
Additional information about these firms and their preferences could be potentially inferred 
using event studies if other sectors are excluded and a greater period of time is considered 
(perhaps over additional years or presidential administrations). 
 
Therefore, while this study was unsuccessful in showing firm political preferences from a 
sectoral perspective, it does provide several opportunities for further analysis outside of the 
restrictive confines of the hypotheses presented here. In addition, the results produced by this 
study could, in and of themselves. be reanalyzed using other methods that would help to 
30 
 
illuminate the true causes of the ARs registered and provide more robust evidence of links 
between economic and political outcomes. 
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A: Firms by Sector  
 
Industrials 
Ticker Name 
ASURB Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste 
PINFRA Promotora y Operadora de Infraestructura 
URBI Urbi Desarrollos Urbanos 
GAPB Grupo Aeroportuario del Pacifico 
HOMEX Desarrolladora Homex 
VOLARA Volaris 
ALFAA Alfa 
OMAB Grupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte 
AEROMEX Aeromexico 
VESTA Corp Inmobiliaria Vesta 
GCARSOA1 Grupo Carso 
ARA Consorcio ARA 
AGUA Grupo Rotoplas 
 
Materials 
Ticker Name 
ICHB Industrias CH 
ELEMENT Elementia 
MFRISCOA Minera Frisco 
PAPPEL Bio Pappel 
AUTLANB Minera Autlán 
35 
 
PE&OLES (PEOLES) Grupo Peñoles 
GISSAA Grupo Industrial Saltillo 
MEXCHEM Mexichem 
GMEXICOB Grupo Mexico 
SIMECB Grupo Simec 
ALPEKA Alpek 
 
Financial Services 
Ticker Name 
GENTERA Gentera 
UNIFINA Unfin Financiera 
Q Qualitas Controladora 
GICSAB Grupo Gicsa 
BSMXB Banco Santander Mexico 
GFNORTEO Grupo Financiero Banorte 
BOLSAA Bolsa Mexicana de Valores 
GFINBURO Grupo Financiero Inbursa 
CREAL Credito Real 
RA Regional 
 
Consumer Discretionary and Services 
Ticker Name 
RASSINIA Rassini 
LIVEPOLC El Puerto de Liverpool 
NEMAKA Nemak 
HCITY Hoteles City Express 
ALSEA Alsea 
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HOTEL Grupo Hotelero Santa Fe 
ELEKTRA Grupo Elektra 
SAREB Sare Holding 
RASSICP Rassini 
 
Energy 
Ticker Name 
IENOVA Infraestructura Energetica Nova 
 
Consumer Staples 
Ticker Name 
BACHOCOB Industrias Bachoco 
HERDEZ Herdez 
LALAB Grupo Lala 
GRUMAB Gruma 
KIMBERA Kimberly-Clark Mexico 
WALMEX Wal-Mart de Mexico 
KOFL Coca Cola Femsa 
CHDRAUIB Grupo Commercial Chedraui 
SORIANAB Organizacíon Soriana 
BIMBOA Grupo Bimbo 
LACOMUBC La Comer 
AC Arca Continental 
 
Healthcare 
Ticker Name 
LABB Genomma Lab Internacional 
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Telecommunications 
Ticker Name 
AMXL America Movil 
 
Information Technology 
Ticker Name 
SITESB1 Telesites 
 
 
Appendix B: Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (MEXBOL) 
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Appendix C: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
July 1, 2018 (Election Day, All Firms) 
 
 
*** p-value < .01, ** p-value <.05, * p-value <.1
                                                                                                                                  
CAAR group 1  (59 securities)    0.59%            0.57%            2.19%*           0.57%            0.82%            0.92%
Ptf CARs n 1 (59 securities)     0.60%            0.58%            2.20%*           0.58%            0.83%            0.94%
_WALMEX                          0.25%           -0.80%           -0.60%           -2.45%           -2.86%           -0.38%
_VOLARA                         -0.42%            1.50%           21.70%***        -0.97%           -6.50%           -7.99%
_VESTA                           1.97%            0.07%            7.06%*           2.37%            5.33%*           1.09%
_UNIFINA                        -0.15%           -1.21%           -1.98%           -2.13%           -0.25%           -7.64%
_URBI                            1.31%           -0.40%           -1.86%           -8.16%           -3.74%           -2.09%
_SORIANAB                       -1.68%           -4.65%**          1.15%            3.78%            5.33%**          4.88%
_SITESB1                         0.54%            0.09%           -0.90%            0.85%            3.12%            3.80%
_SIMECB                          1.28%           -1.63%           -0.76%            3.24%            7.81%**          7.05%
_SAREB                           5.37%*           1.96%            8.45%           -4.02%            2.70%           -5.60%
_RASSINIA                        1.05%           -4.55%           -5.43%           -2.99%            3.23%            2.59%
_RASSICPO                        0.48%           -0.32%            0.40%           -1.21%           -0.56%           -3.05%
_RA                             -0.09%            1.13%            4.62%            1.76%            0.81%           -0.59%
_Q                              -0.81%           -2.29%           -0.59%           -4.17%           -3.63%           -6.84%
_PINFRA                          0.80%            0.54%            4.10%           -2.52%           -1.11%           -2.40%
_PEOLES                         -4.46%**         -1.69%           -8.64%            1.31%           -1.30%           -2.67%
_PAPPEL                          2.22%            2.24%           23.35%***         1.18%           -1.05%           -2.39%
_OMAB                            0.61%            0.45%            1.72%            0.31%            2.04%            2.35%
_NEMAKA                          0.63%            1.20%           -1.51%            1.58%            0.63%            0.90%
_MFRISCOA                        1.34%            0.78%           11.11%*           1.58%            0.44%           -0.24%
_MEXCHEM                         1.37%            0.32%            0.54%            2.14%            1.29%            2.06%
_LIVEPOLC                        1.23%            0.95%            7.15%            3.92%            7.23%**          7.28%
_LALAB                           1.73%            4.92%*           1.04%            6.76%            2.14%            1.04%
_LACOMUBC                        6.29%***         0.99%           -3.30%            2.71%           10.00%***        11.02%**
_LABB                           -0.33%           -1.18%           -1.07%           -2.50%           -1.87%           -1.62%
_KOFL                           -0.40%            1.16%            1.87%           -1.36%           -5.05%*          -7.23%**
_KIMBERA                         0.70%            0.22%            1.61%            2.34%            5.90%*           5.04%
_IENOVA                          0.84%            1.84%            1.50%            1.97%            2.00%            4.71%
_ICHB                           -2.34%           -2.30%           -2.74%           -0.58%            1.54%            2.57%
_HOTEL                          -0.86%            2.71%            4.52%            0.53%           -1.58%            0.32%
_HOMEX                           0.32%           10.69%            2.53%            9.24%           -4.47%          -13.22%
_HERDEZ                         -3.42%**         -4.23%           -3.81%           -2.24%           -3.42%            0.37%
_HCITY                           1.17%            1.65%            9.68%**         -4.98%           -4.80%           -9.06%*
_GRUMAB                         -0.53%            1.04%            1.56%            4.20%            0.82%            3.94%
_GMEXICOB                        1.48%           -1.70%           -7.27%           -3.25%           -2.19%           -4.42%
_GISSAA                          2.02%           -0.54%            1.98%            1.03%            0.10%           13.00%***
_GICSAB                          2.30%            5.77%*           5.18%           -0.35%           -2.83%           -3.02%
_GFNORTEO                       -1.93%            0.37%            0.41%            1.89%            0.66%            3.45%
_GFINBURO                        2.78%*           2.08%            4.09%           -1.11%           -1.04%           -0.77%
_GENTERA                         5.09%***         8.26%***        11.06%*           9.65%**          9.16%**         11.60%*
_GCARSOA1                        0.00%            2.94%            1.72%            5.14%            1.93%            3.02%
_GAPB                            0.92%            2.32%            0.77%           -0.43%           -2.24%           -0.39%
_ELEMENT                         1.90%            1.29%            3.21%            0.02%            1.04%            2.33%
_ELEKTRA                        -4.24%           -2.39%            8.77%           -2.26%           -0.11%           -1.36%
_CREAL                           1.20%            3.45%           10.89%**         -0.52%           -1.94%           -2.82%
_CHDRAUIB                        0.73%            0.13%            2.80%            3.03%            3.55%            9.11%**
_BSMXB                          -0.69%            3.36%           10.76%***         2.51%           -1.28%           -6.68%
_BOLSAA                          2.83%*           5.05%*           4.38%            1.11%           -1.07%            0.52%
_BIMBOA                         -1.18%           -1.14%            1.46%            1.37%            1.10%            2.75%
_BACHOCOB                        0.06%           -0.90%           -0.74%           -3.43%            0.29%            0.56%
_AUTLANB                         3.17%*          -0.52%            0.49%           -2.16%            0.74%            2.26%
_ASURB                           1.17%           -0.48%           -2.62%           -1.78%           -2.61%           -2.00%
_ARA                            -0.11%           -2.74%           -0.02%           -3.96%           -0.66%            4.94%
_AMXL                           -0.18%           -2.11%           -2.19%           -2.16%           -1.15%           -2.72%
_ALSEA                          -2.37%*          -3.21%           -4.27%           -0.82%           -1.02%            2.94%
_ALPEKA                          0.10%           -0.03%           -1.02%            0.66%            2.86%            3.43%
_ALFAA                          -0.01%           -0.91%           -1.73%            2.14%            2.15%            2.85%
_AGUA                           -1.89%           -0.03%           -3.56%            7.28%*           6.25%*           9.92%*
_AEROMEX                         4.38%***         4.93%*           3.49%           10.32%***        16.68%***        16.95%***
_AC                              0.77%           -1.24%           -1.90%           -2.38%           -1.25%            0.09%
SECURITY                       CAAR[0,1]        CAAR[0,3]        CAAR[0,10]       CAAR[-3,3]       CAAR[-5,1]       CAAR[-10,1]
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July 1, 2018 by Sector (Divided by Horizonal Line) 
Hypothesis 1: Industrials, Materials and Financial Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
*** p-value < .01, ** p-value <.05, * p-value <.1
                                                                                                                                  
CAAR group 3  (10 securities)    1.05%            2.60%**          4.88%**          0.86%           -0.14%           -1.28%
Ptf CARs n 3 (10 securities)     1.05%*           2.60%**          4.88%**          0.86%           -0.14%           -1.28%
_RA                             -0.09%            1.13%            4.62%            1.76%            0.81%           -0.59%
_CREAL                           1.20%            3.45%           10.89%**         -0.52%           -1.94%           -2.82%
_GFINBURO                        2.78%*           2.08%            4.09%           -1.11%           -1.04%           -0.77%
_BOLSAA                          2.83%*           5.05%*           4.38%            1.11%           -1.07%            0.52%
_GFNORTEO                       -1.93%            0.37%            0.41%            1.89%            0.66%            3.45%
_BSMXB                          -0.69%            3.36%           10.76%***         2.51%           -1.28%           -6.68%
_GICSAB                          2.30%            5.77%*           5.18%           -0.35%           -2.83%           -3.02%
_Q                              -0.81%           -2.29%           -0.59%           -4.17%           -3.63%           -6.84%
_UNIFINA                        -0.15%           -1.21%           -1.98%           -2.13%           -0.25%           -7.64%
_GENTERA                         5.09%***         8.26%***        11.06%*           9.65%**          9.16%**         11.60%*
                                                                                                                                  
CAAR group 2  (11 securities)    0.73%           -0.34%            1.84%            0.47%            1.02%            2.09%
Ptf CARs n 2 (11 securities)     0.73%           -0.34%            1.84%            0.47%            1.02%            2.09%
_SIMECB                          1.28%           -1.63%           -0.76%            3.24%            7.81%**          7.05%
_GMEXICOB                        1.48%           -1.70%           -7.27%           -3.25%           -2.19%           -4.42%
_MEXCHEM                         1.37%            0.32%            0.54%            2.14%            1.29%            2.06%
_GISSAA                          2.02%           -0.54%            1.98%            1.03%            0.10%           13.00%***
_PEOLES                         -4.46%**         -1.69%           -8.64%            1.31%           -1.30%           -2.67%
_AUTLANB                         3.17%*          -0.52%            0.49%           -2.16%            0.74%            2.26%
_PAPPEL                          2.22%            2.24%           23.35%***         1.18%           -1.05%           -2.39%
_MFRISCOA                        1.34%            0.78%           11.11%*           1.58%            0.44%           -0.24%
_ALPEKA                          0.10%           -0.03%           -1.02%            0.66%            2.86%            3.43%
_ELEMENT                         1.90%            1.29%            3.21%            0.02%            1.04%            2.33%
_ICHB                           -2.34%           -2.30%           -2.74%           -0.58%            1.54%            2.57%
                                                                                                                                  
CAAR group 1  (13 securities)    0.76%            1.51%            2.60%            1.52%            1.08%            1.15%
Ptf CARs n 1 (13 securities)     0.80%            1.55%            2.64%            1.56%            1.12%            1.21%
_AGUA                           -1.89%           -0.03%           -3.56%            7.28%*           6.25%*           9.92%*
_ARA                            -0.11%           -2.74%           -0.02%           -3.96%           -0.66%            4.94%
_GCARSOA1                        0.00%            2.94%            1.72%            5.14%            1.93%            3.02%
_VESTA                           1.97%            0.07%            7.06%*           2.37%            5.33%*           1.09%
_AEROMEX                         4.38%***         4.93%*           3.49%           10.32%***        16.68%***        16.95%***
_OMAB                            0.61%            0.45%            1.72%            0.31%            2.04%            2.35%
_ALFAA                          -0.01%           -0.91%           -1.73%            2.14%            2.15%            2.85%
_VOLARA                         -0.42%            1.50%           21.70%***        -0.97%           -6.50%           -7.99%
_HOMEX                           0.32%           10.69%            2.53%            9.24%           -4.47%          -13.22%
_GAPB                            0.92%            2.32%            0.77%           -0.43%           -2.24%           -0.39%
_URBI                            1.31%           -0.40%           -1.86%           -8.16%           -3.74%           -2.09%
_PINFRA                          0.80%            0.54%            4.10%           -2.52%           -1.11%           -2.40%
_ASURB                           1.17%           -0.48%           -2.62%           -1.78%           -2.61%           -2.00%
SECURITY                       CAAR[0,1]        CAAR[0,3]        CAAR[0,10]       CAAR[-3,3]       CAAR[-5,1]       CAAR[-10,1]
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Hypothesis 2: Consumer Discretionary and Services 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Energy, Consumer Staples,  
Healthcare, Telecommunications, Information Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p-value < .01, ** p-value <.05, * p-value <.1
                                                                                                                                 
CAAR group 1  (9 securities)    0.27%           -0.22%            3.09%           -1.14%            0.64%           -0.56%
Ptf CARs n 1 (9 securities)     0.27%           -0.22%            3.09%           -1.14%            0.64%           -0.56%
_RASSICP                        0.48%           -0.32%            0.40%           -1.21%           -0.56%           -3.05%
_SAREB                          5.37%*           1.96%            8.45%           -4.02%            2.70%           -5.60%
_ELEKTRA                       -4.24%           -2.39%            8.77%           -2.26%           -0.11%           -1.36%
_HOTEL                         -0.86%            2.71%            4.52%            0.53%           -1.58%            0.32%
_ALSEA                         -2.37%*          -3.21%           -4.27%           -0.82%           -1.02%            2.94%
_HCITY                          1.17%            1.65%            9.68%**         -4.98%           -4.80%           -9.06%*
_NEMAKA                         0.63%            1.20%           -1.51%            1.58%            0.63%            0.90%
_LIVEPOLC                       1.23%            0.95%            7.15%            3.92%            7.23%**          7.28%
_RASSINIA                       1.05%           -4.55%           -5.43%           -2.99%            3.23%            2.59%
SECURITY                      CAAR[0,1]        CAAR[0,3]        CAAR[0,10]       CAAR[-3,3]       CAAR[-5,1]       CAAR[-10,1]
*** p-value < .01, ** p-value <.05, * p-value <.1
                                                                                                             
_SITESB1    0.54%            0.09%           -0.90%            0.85%            3.12%            3.80%
                                                                                                             
_AMXL      -0.18%           -2.11%           -2.19%           -2.16%           -1.15%           -2.72%
                                                                                                             
_LABB      -0.33%           -1.18%           -1.07%           -2.50%           -1.87%           -1.62%
                                                                                                             
CAAR group 2  (12 securities)   0.28% -0.37%  0.10%            1.03%            1.38%            2.60%
Ptf CARs n 2 (12 securities)   0.28% -0.37%   0.10%            1.03%            1.38%            2.60%*
_AC         0.77%           -1.24%           -1.90%           -2.38%           -1.25%            0.09%
_LACOMUBC   6.29%***         0.99%           -3.30%            2.71%           10.00%***        11.02%**
_BIMBOA    -1.18%           -1.14%            1.46%            1.37%            1.10%            2.75%
_SORIANAB  -1.68%           -4.65%**          1.15%            3.78%            5.33%**          4.88%
_CHDRAUIB   0.73%            0.13%            2.80%            3.03%            3.55%            9.11%**
_KOFL      -0.40%            1.16%            1.87%           -1.36%           -5.05%*          -7.23%**
_WALMEX     0.25%           -0.80%           -0.60%           -2.45%           -2.86%           -0.38%
_KIMBERA    0.70%            0.22%            1.61%            2.34%            5.90%*           5.04%
_GRUMAB    -0.53%            1.04%            1.56%            4.20%            0.82%            3.94%
_LALAB      1.73%            4.92%*           1.04%            6.76%            2.14%            1.04%
_HERDEZ    -3.42%**         -4.23%           -3.81%           -2.24%           -3.42%            0.37%
_BACHOCOB   0.06%           -0.90%           -0.74%           -3.43%            0.29%            0.56%
                                                                                                             
_IENOVA     0.84%            1.84%            1.50%            1.97%            2.00%            4.71%
SECURITY  CAAR[0,1]        CAAR[0,3]        CAAR[0,10]       CAAR[-3,3]       CAAR[-5,1]       CAAR[-10,1]
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February 11, 2018 (End of Primaries, All Firms) 
 
 
 
*** p-value < .01, ** p-value <.05, * p-value <.1
                                                                                                                                  
CAAR group 1  (57 securities)    0.38%            0.27%            1.53%           -0.20%           -0.64%           -0.79%
Ptf CARs n 1 (57 securities)     0.38%            0.27%            1.52%           -0.20%           -0.63%           -0.78%
_ICHB                            1.28%            1.17%            5.11%           -1.59%           -1.28%           -6.92%
_URBI                            0.27%            0.63%            5.35%           -5.99%           -7.27%            0.55%
_VOLARA                          2.38%            7.31%**         14.89%**          4.06%           -4.55%           -2.24%
_VESTA                           0.82%            4.67%**          2.79%            6.03%*           1.70%            1.12%
_UNIFINA                         0.52%           -1.01%            1.78%           -1.87%           -2.53%           -1.90%
_SORIANAB                        0.61%           -1.12%           -1.66%           -0.69%           -0.80%           -1.85%
_SITESB1                        -0.43%            7.05%***         6.85%           10.73%***        -1.07%           -8.05%
_SAREB                           6.83%**         -5.15%            9.77%           -9.43%           -5.71%          -23.83%**
_RASSINIA                        0.00%            1.97%            5.41%            1.16%            1.80%            0.35%
_RASSICPO                        2.01%            4.77%*           6.14%            0.58%            1.60%            2.30%
_RA                              1.93%            1.34%            5.41%           -0.04%            3.30%            4.51%
_Q                              -0.36%            3.38%            4.33%            5.14%            3.15%           18.48%***
_PINFRA                         -0.29%            0.89%           -0.80%            6.04%**          4.48%            4.51%
_PEOLES                         -0.59%           -0.79%            3.71%            2.15%           -3.26%           -5.31%
_PAPPEL                          1.89%           -0.90%            0.31%           -4.59%           -1.52%           -3.04%
_OMAB                            0.02%           -1.11%            1.58%            1.08%            2.26%           -0.28%
_NEMAKA                         -0.53%           -9.19%***       -10.36%**         -9.98%***        -0.29%           -0.53%
_MFRISCOA                        2.28%            5.00%            1.07%            0.18%            1.60%            2.21%
_MEXCHEM                        -0.13%            1.98%            5.18%            3.25%            0.50%            0.47%
_LIVEPOLC                        0.87%            0.44%            3.18%            0.27%            0.04%            2.56%
_LALAB                          -0.63%            1.59%           -1.19%            2.00%           -0.56%           -2.40%
_LACOMUBC                        2.48%*           1.40%            3.12%           -2.67%           -2.18%           -2.45%
_LABB                           -0.91%           -1.35%           -5.58%            2.89%            2.39%           -2.87%
_KOFL                           -0.63%           -2.76%           -5.30%           -4.41%*          -2.47%           -2.47%
_KIMBERA                         1.11%            1.58%            3.03%            1.22%            2.79%            4.33%
_IENOVA                         -0.42%           -1.08%           -3.32%           -0.46%            0.37%            2.24%
_HOTEL                          -1.21%           -0.77%            3.76%            1.01%           -2.14%           -3.41%
_HOMEX                          -5.56%           -8.76%           -6.80%          -16.13%          -13.07%           -9.36%
_HERDEZ                          0.04%           -0.64%           -0.18%           -2.30%           -3.19%           -2.02%
_HCITY                           1.91%            2.25%            5.80%            5.42%*           3.40%            2.72%
_GRUMAB                          0.40%           -2.64%           -2.80%            0.44%            2.02%            2.36%
_GMEXICOB                        1.35%            3.18%            3.64%            3.40%            1.69%            1.75%
_GISSAA                         -1.31%           -3.65%*          -5.93%*          -6.79%**         -4.95%*          -5.44%
_GICSAB                          2.84%*          11.40%***         7.50%           15.75%***         4.21%            0.82%
_GFNORTEO                       -0.46%           -1.39%           -2.62%            3.61%            5.42%            8.35%*
_GFINBURO                       -1.11%           -3.57%           -2.27%           -4.29%            0.68%           -2.93%
_GENTERA                         1.03%           -1.26%            6.63%           -1.53%           -1.09%            1.79%
_GCARSOA1                        0.00%           -2.08%           -3.81%            3.47%            3.80%           10.49%**
_GAPB                            1.86%            0.62%            1.05%           -0.39%           -0.68%           -3.83%
_ELEMENT                         0.37%            2.34%            0.54%           -1.39%           -2.23%            0.59%
_ELEKTRA                        -3.08%           -0.55%           -3.73%           -9.82%          -13.21%*         -12.05%
_CREAL                           0.23%           -1.33%           10.24%**         -4.41%           -3.09%           -3.44%
_CHDRAUIB                        1.52%            0.82%           -0.45%            0.29%            1.76%            2.67%
_BSMXB                          -0.10%            0.24%            0.39%           -1.08%           -2.10%           -4.32%
_BOLSAA                         -0.08%            0.59%            0.65%           -3.69%           -4.31%           -3.67%
_BIMBOA                         -1.03%           -3.01%           -1.96%           -2.44%            1.77%            2.65%
_BACHOCOB                        1.18%            1.04%           -1.57%            0.49%            0.29%           -2.15%
_AUTLANB                         0.58%            2.90%            4.23%            7.67%*           2.41%           -0.07%
_ASURB                           0.70%            0.09%            0.75%           -1.93%           -2.16%           -2.14%
_ARA                            -0.21%           -0.22%            0.44%           -0.02%           -2.08%           -1.15%
_AMXL                           -0.03%            2.99%            4.65%            2.88%            0.23%            0.48%
_ALSEA                          -0.15%           -0.56%            2.92%            2.64%            5.24%            2.80%
_ALPEKA                          2.54%            1.24%           -2.16%            1.78%            2.44%            6.11%
_ALFAA                          -2.00%           -2.15%           -1.63%            1.82%           -0.48%           -1.07%
_AGUA                            0.70%           -2.17%            4.51%           -8.32%**         -5.46%           -5.99%
_AEROMEX                         0.54%            0.73%            6.37%           -2.15%           -3.15%           -4.78%
_AC                             -0.46%           -1.40%           -2.75%           -0.56%           -0.96%           -0.82%
SECURITY                       CAAR[0,1]        CAAR[0,3]        CAAR[0,10]       CAAR[-3,3]       CAAR[-5,1]       CAAR[-10,1]
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February 11, 2018 by Sector (Divided by Horizonal Line) 
Hypothesis 1: Industrials, Materials and Financial Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p-value < .01, ** p-value <.05, * p-value <.1
                                                                                                                                  
CAAR group 3  (10 securities)    0.44%            0.84%            3.21%*           0.76%            0.36%            1.77%
Ptf CARs n 3 (10 securities)     0.44%            0.84%            3.21%*           0.76%            0.36%            1.77%
_RA                              1.93%            1.34%            5.41%           -0.04%            3.30%            4.51%
_CREAL                           0.23%           -1.33%           10.24%**         -4.41%           -3.09%           -3.44%
_GFINBURO                       -1.11%           -3.57%           -2.27%           -4.29%            0.68%           -2.93%
_BOLSAA                         -0.08%            0.59%            0.65%           -3.69%           -4.31%           -3.67%
_GFNORTEO                       -0.46%           -1.39%           -2.62%            3.61%            5.42%            8.35%*
_BSMXB                          -0.10%            0.24%            0.39%           -1.08%           -2.10%           -4.32%
_GICSAB                          2.84%*          11.40%***         7.50%           15.75%***         4.21%            0.82%
_Q                              -0.36%            3.38%            4.33%            5.14%            3.15%           18.48%***
_UNIFINA                         0.52%           -1.01%            1.78%           -1.87%           -2.53%           -1.90%
_GENTERA                         1.03%           -1.26%            6.63%           -1.53%           -1.09%            1.79%
                                                                                                                                  
CAAR group 2  (11 securities)    0.73%            0.99%            1.52%            0.38%           -0.40%           -0.96%
Ptf CARs n 2 (11 securities)     0.73%            0.99%            1.52%            0.38%           -0.40%           -0.96%
_SIMECB                         -0.21%           -1.57%            0.98%            0.08%            0.22%           -0.88%
_GMEXICOB                        1.35%            3.18%            3.64%            3.40%            1.69%            1.75%
_MEXCHEM                        -0.13%            1.98%            5.18%            3.25%            0.50%            0.47%
_GISSAA                         -1.31%           -3.65%*          -5.93%*          -6.79%**         -4.95%*          -5.44%
_PEOLES                         -0.59%           -0.79%            3.71%            2.15%           -3.26%           -5.31%
_AUTLANB                         0.58%            2.90%            4.23%            7.67%*           2.41%           -0.07%
_PAPPEL                          1.89%           -0.90%            0.31%           -4.59%           -1.52%           -3.04%
_MFRISCOA                        2.28%            5.00%            1.07%            0.18%            1.60%            2.21%
_ALPEKA                          2.54%            1.24%           -2.16%            1.78%            2.44%            6.11%
_ELEMENT                         0.37%            2.34%            0.54%           -1.39%           -2.23%            0.59%
_ICHB                            1.28%            1.17%            5.11%           -1.59%           -1.28%           -6.92%
                                                                                                                                  
CAAR group 1  (13 securities)   -0.06%           -0.12%            1.90%           -0.96%           -2.12%           -1.12%
Ptf CARs n 1 (13 securities)    -0.06%           -0.13%            1.88%           -0.97%           -2.08%           -1.08%
_AGUA                            0.70%           -2.17%            4.51%           -8.32%**         -5.46%           -5.99%
_ARA                            -0.21%           -0.22%            0.44%           -0.02%           -2.08%           -1.15%
_GCARSOA1                        0.00%           -2.08%           -3.81%            3.47%            3.80%           10.49%**
_VESTA                           0.82%            4.67%**          2.79%            6.03%*           1.70%            1.12%
_AEROMEX                         0.54%            0.73%            6.37%           -2.15%           -3.15%           -4.78%
_OMAB                            0.02%           -1.11%            1.58%            1.08%            2.26%           -0.28%
_ALFAA                          -2.00%           -2.15%           -1.63%            1.82%           -0.48%           -1.07%
_VOLARA                          2.38%            7.31%**         14.89%**          4.06%           -4.55%           -2.24%
_HOMEX                          -5.56%           -8.76%           -6.80%          -16.13%          -13.07%           -9.36%
_GAPB                            1.86%            0.62%            1.05%           -0.39%           -0.68%           -3.83%
_URBI                            0.27%            0.63%            5.35%           -5.99%           -7.27%            0.55%
_PINFRA                         -0.29%            0.89%           -0.80%            6.04%**          4.48%            4.51%
_ASURB                           0.70%            0.09%            0.75%           -1.93%           -2.16%           -2.14%
SECURITY                       CAAR[0,1]        CAAR[0,3]        CAAR[0,10]       CAAR[-3,3]       CAAR[-5,1]       CAAR[-10,1]
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Hypothesis 2: Consumer Discretionary and Services 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Energy, Consumer Staples,  
Healthcare, Telecommunications, Information Technology 
 
 
 
 
*** p-value < .01, ** p-value <.05, * p-value <.1
                                                                                                                                 
CAAR group 1  (9 securities)    0.74%           -0.76%            2.54%           -2.02%           -1.03%           -3.23%
Ptf CARs n 1 (9 securities)     0.74%           -0.76%            2.54%           -2.02%           -1.03%           -3.23%
_RASSICP                        2.01%            4.77%*           6.14%            0.58%            1.60%            2.30%
_SAREB                          6.83%**         -5.15%            9.77%           -9.43%           -5.71%          -23.83%**
_ELEKTRA                       -3.08%           -0.55%           -3.73%           -9.82%          -13.21%*         -12.05%
_HOTEL                         -1.21%           -0.77%            3.76%            1.01%           -2.14%           -3.41%
_ALSEA                         -0.15%           -0.56%            2.92%            2.64%            5.24%            2.80%
_HCITY                          1.91%            2.25%            5.80%            5.42%*           3.40%            2.72%
_NEMAKA                        -0.53%           -9.19%***       -10.36%**         -9.98%***        -0.29%           -0.53%
_LIVEPOLC                       0.87%            0.44%            3.18%            0.27%            0.04%            2.56%
_RASSINIA                       0.00%            1.97%            5.41%            1.16%            1.80%            0.35%
SECURITY                      CAAR[0,1]        CAAR[0,3]        CAAR[0,10]       CAAR[-3,3]       CAAR[-5,1]       CAAR[-10,1]
*** p-value < .01, ** p-value <.05, * p-value <.1
                                                                                                             
_SITESB1   -0.43%            7.05%***         6.85%           10.73%***        -1.07%           -8.05%
                                                                                                             
_AMXL      -0.03%            2.99%            4.65%            2.88%            0.23%            0.48%
                                                                                                             
_LABB      -0.91%           -1.35%           -5.58%            2.89%            2.39%           -2.87%
                                                                                                             
CAAR group 2  (12 securities)   0.42% -0.49% -1.06%           -0.57%            0.03%           -0.03%
Ptf CARs n 2 (12 securities)   0.42% -0.49%  -1.06%           -0.57%            0.03%           -0.03%
_AC        -0.46%           -1.40%           -2.75%           -0.56%           -0.96%           -0.82%
_LACOMUBC   2.48%*           1.40%            3.12%           -2.67%           -2.18%           -2.45%
_BIMBOA    -1.03%           -3.01%           -1.96%           -2.44%            1.77%            2.65%
_SORIANAB   0.61%           -1.12%           -1.66%           -0.69%           -0.80%           -1.85%
_CHDRAUIB   1.52%            0.82%           -0.45%            0.29%            1.76%            2.67%
_KOFL      -0.63%           -2.76%           -5.30%           -4.41%*          -2.47%           -2.47%
_WALMEX     0.45%           -0.79%           -1.04%            1.77%            1.86%            1.87%
_KIMBERA    1.11%            1.58%            3.03%            1.22%            2.79%            4.33%
_GRUMAB     0.40%           -2.64%           -2.80%            0.44%            2.02%            2.36%
_LALAB     -0.63%            1.59%           -1.19%            2.00%           -0.56%           -2.40%
_HERDEZ     0.04%           -0.64%           -0.18%           -2.30%           -3.19%           -2.02%
_BACHOCOB   1.18%            1.04%           -1.57%            0.49%            0.29%           -2.15%
                                                                                                             
_IENOVA    -0.42%           -1.08%           -3.32%           -0.46%            0.37%            2.24%
SECURITY  CAAR[0,1]        CAAR[0,3]        CAAR[0,10]       CAAR[-3,3]       CAAR[-5,1]       CAAR[-10,1]
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April 2, 2018 (First Market Day of Campaign Season, All Firms) 
 
 
 
*** p-value < .01, ** p-value <.05, * p-value <.1
                                                                                                                                  
CAAR group 1  (57 securities)   -0.48%            0.21%           -0.23%           -0.10%           -0.85%           -0.06%
Ptf CARs n 1 (57 securities)    -0.48%            0.21%           -0.22%           -0.10%           -0.85%           -0.05%
_ICHB                            2.40%           23.15%***        20.95%***        16.72%***        -0.90%           -1.11%
_URBI                           -6.46%           -3.83%           -1.86%           -5.94%           -7.85%           -5.97%
_VOLARA                          4.44%*           8.51%**         10.65%*           7.01%            2.53%            1.47%
_VESTA                           2.40%            2.67%            0.44%            4.80%            5.83%*          11.33%**
_UNIFINA                         2.16%            7.16%**          4.60%            5.17%            0.12%           -3.36%
_SORIANAB                       -2.06%           -1.72%           -2.37%           -0.59%            0.08%           -2.70%
_SITESB1                        -1.50%           -1.76%           -3.05%           -1.89%           -0.62%            0.25%
_SAREB                          -2.64%           -4.87%           -7.21%          -10.63%           -4.93%            1.95%
_RASSINIA                       -4.89%**         -4.74%            1.25%            1.41%            2.54%            0.29%
_RASSICPO                       -0.15%           -0.03%            3.21%            2.02%            1.59%            2.14%
_RA                              1.62%           -0.14%           -0.24%            1.20%            1.78%            3.00%
_Q                               1.71%           -0.26%           -0.95%           -2.01%           -0.62%           -0.02%
_PINFRA                         -0.48%            0.10%           -0.58%            0.01%           -2.38%           -1.52%
_PEOLES                         -1.59%            3.16%           -1.34%            0.99%           -5.37%           -6.01%
_PAPPEL                         -0.93%           -2.60%           -2.21%            0.52%            3.19%           -1.75%
_OMAB                           -0.47%           -0.35%            6.41%           -1.22%           -3.47%           -2.77%
_NEMAKA                          1.83%            2.85%           -3.14%            6.31%            2.05%            1.95%
_MFRISCOA                       -2.95%            2.40%           -2.01%            0.02%           -4.57%           -1.73%
_MEXCHEM                        -0.14%            0.39%           -0.28%            0.33%           -0.11%            5.84%
_LIVEPOLC                        0.84%           -0.97%           -4.44%           -1.08%            1.76%            4.66%
_LALAB                          -2.67%           -2.88%           -7.59%           -4.49%           -2.11%           -5.58%
_LACOMUBC                        5.84%***         4.85%*           4.22%            7.65%**          8.88%**         11.02%**
_LABB                            2.13%           -1.00%           -1.63%           -1.05%            4.52%            5.09%
_KOFL                           -2.01%           -2.52%           -2.39%           -2.91%           -2.14%           -2.40%
_KIMBERA                        -2.57%           -3.33%           -1.84%           -4.76%           -5.26%           -0.41%
_IENOVA                          0.56%            1.11%           -3.95%            1.20%            0.19%            1.33%
_HOTEL                          -4.67%***        -4.76%**         -4.98%           -2.62%           -3.58%           -4.26%
_HOMEX                          -5.24%          -12.57%          -23.79%          -15.06%           -7.29%           -5.55%
_HERDEZ                         -3.26%           -1.76%            5.33%           -3.79%           -7.18%*          -4.49%
_HCITY                          -0.71%            3.15%           -0.90%           -3.87%            0.70%           -0.24%
_GRUMAB                         -0.28%            2.13%            5.99%            2.03%           -3.27%           -3.04%
_GMEXICOB                        0.96%           -1.30%           -1.13%           -1.04%           -1.79%           -0.64%
_GISSAA                         -1.24%           -0.13%            0.95%            5.63%*           3.69%            1.16%
_GICSAB                         -0.93%            2.95%           -2.19%            0.69%           -6.87%           -0.32%
_GFNORTEO                       -0.61%           -1.52%            0.77%           -2.70%            0.01%            1.12%
_GFINBURO                       -0.60%           -1.37%           -3.19%           -1.19%           -1.98%           -0.60%
_GENTERA                        -2.30%            5.29%           11.05%*           5.31%           -3.31%           -0.96%
_GCARSOA1                        0.63%           -0.02%            0.32%           -1.20%           -0.27%           -1.80%
_GAPB                            0.78%            1.40%            3.84%            2.16%           -0.36%            1.84%
_ELEMENT                        -0.85%           -2.52%           -5.66%           -7.99%**         -6.53%*          -4.46%
_ELEKTRA                        -0.67%           -0.49%           -3.97%           -1.37%           -3.20%           -6.03%
_CREAL                           3.16%            4.80%            7.03%            3.02%           -0.52%            4.20%
_CHDRAUIB                        0.21%           -1.72%           -0.79%           -1.96%           -1.21%           -1.46%
_BSMXB                           1.01%            1.85%            1.46%            5.02%            3.59%            2.30%
_BOLSAA                          3.51%*           1.25%            4.00%            0.91%           12.90%***         5.30%
_BIMBOA                         -1.87%           -0.43%            0.37%           -3.82%           -4.47%           -2.06%
_BACHOCOB                       -2.03%           -0.15%           -2.78%            3.00%           -1.35%           -0.68%
_AUTLANB                         0.47%            7.06%**          6.11%            8.04%*           2.00%            1.16%
_ASURB                          -1.34%           -3.00%           -1.06%           -3.84%           -3.07%           -4.66%
_ARA                            -2.71%            1.36%           -2.47%           -1.27%          -10.66%***       -10.53%**
_AMXL                            0.30%           -2.02%           -4.67%           -1.83%            0.78%            0.89%
_ALSEA                           1.28%           -0.45%            3.09%           -1.17%            0.82%            4.93%
_ALPEKA                         -2.39%           -2.64%            0.31%           -5.21%           -2.28%            1.85%
_ALFAA                           1.02%           -0.61%           -3.51%           -0.40%            0.42%            4.30%
_AGUA                           -2.97%           -4.35%           -6.63%            3.05%            2.76%            1.39%
_AEROMEX                        -0.24%           -1.10%           -0.39%            0.99%            1.88%            6.49%
_AC                             -0.46%           -1.90%           -0.07%           -3.48%           -2.82%           -3.02%
SECURITY                       CAAR[0,1]        CAAR[0,3]        CAAR[0,10]       CAAR[-3,3]       CAAR[-5,1]       CAAR[-10,1]
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Hypothesis 1: Industrials, Materials and Financial Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p-value < .01, ** p-value <.05, * p-value <.1
                                                                                                                                  
CAAR group 3  (10 securities)    0.87%            2.00%*           2.23%            1.54%            0.51%            1.06%
Ptf CARs n 3 (10 securities)     0.87%            2.00%*           2.23%            1.54%            0.51%            1.06%
_RA                              1.62%           -0.14%           -0.24%            1.20%            1.78%            3.00%
_CREAL                           3.16%            4.80%            7.03%            3.02%           -0.52%            4.20%
_GFINBURO                       -0.60%           -1.37%           -3.19%           -1.19%           -1.98%           -0.60%
_BOLSAA                          3.51%*           1.25%            4.00%            0.91%           12.90%***         5.30%
_GFNORTEO                       -0.61%           -1.52%            0.77%           -2.70%            0.01%            1.12%
_BSMXB                           1.01%            1.85%            1.46%            5.02%            3.59%            2.30%
_GICSAB                         -0.93%            2.95%           -2.19%            0.69%           -6.87%           -0.32%
_Q                               1.71%           -0.26%           -0.95%           -2.01%           -0.62%           -0.02%
_UNIFINA                         2.16%            7.16%**          4.60%            5.17%            0.12%           -3.36%
_GENTERA                        -2.30%            5.29%           11.05%*           5.31%           -3.31%           -0.96%
                                                                                                                                  
CAAR group 2  (11 securities)   -0.57%            2.81%            1.47%            1.89%           -1.16%           -0.70%
Ptf CARs n 2 (11 securities)    -0.57%            2.81%**          1.47%            1.89%           -1.16%           -0.70%
_SIMECB                         -0.02%            3.93%            0.45%            2.82%           -0.07%           -1.97%
_GMEXICOB                        0.96%           -1.30%           -1.13%           -1.04%           -1.79%           -0.64%
_MEXCHEM                        -0.14%            0.39%           -0.28%            0.33%           -0.11%            5.84%
_GISSAA                         -1.24%           -0.13%            0.95%            5.63%*           3.69%            1.16%
_PEOLES                         -1.59%            3.16%           -1.34%            0.99%           -5.37%           -6.01%
_AUTLANB                         0.47%            7.06%**          6.11%            8.04%*           2.00%            1.16%
_PAPPEL                         -0.93%           -2.60%           -2.21%            0.52%            3.19%           -1.75%
_MFRISCOA                       -2.95%            2.40%           -2.01%            0.02%           -4.57%           -1.73%
_ALPEKA                         -2.39%           -2.64%            0.31%           -5.21%           -2.28%            1.85%
_ELEMENT                        -0.85%           -2.52%           -5.66%           -7.99%**         -6.53%*          -4.46%
_ICHB                            2.40%           23.15%***        20.95%***        16.72%***        -0.90%           -1.11%
                                                                                                                                  
CAAR group 1  (13 securities)   -0.77%           -0.86%           -1.36%           -0.88%           -1.73%           -0.51%
Ptf CARs n 1 (13 securities)    -0.76%           -0.86%           -1.36%           -0.89%           -1.73%           -0.50%
_AGUA                           -2.97%           -4.35%           -6.63%            3.05%            2.76%            1.39%
_ARA                            -2.71%            1.36%           -2.47%           -1.27%          -10.66%***       -10.53%**
_GCARSOA1                        0.63%           -0.02%            0.32%           -1.20%           -0.27%           -1.80%
_VESTA                           2.40%            2.67%            0.44%            4.80%            5.83%*          11.33%**
_AEROMEX                        -0.24%           -1.10%           -0.39%            0.99%            1.88%            6.49%
_OMAB                           -0.47%           -0.35%            6.41%           -1.22%           -3.47%           -2.77%
_ALFAA                           1.02%           -0.61%           -3.51%           -0.40%            0.42%            4.30%
_VOLARA                          4.44%*           8.51%**         10.65%*           7.01%            2.53%            1.47%
_HOMEX                          -5.24%          -12.57%          -23.79%          -15.06%           -7.29%           -5.55%
_GAPB                            0.78%            1.40%            3.84%            2.16%           -0.36%            1.84%
_URBI                           -6.46%           -3.83%           -1.86%           -5.94%           -7.85%           -5.97%
_PINFRA                         -0.48%            0.10%           -0.58%            0.01%           -2.38%           -1.52%
_ASURB                          -1.34%           -3.00%           -1.06%           -3.84%           -3.07%           -4.66%
SECURITY                       CAAR[0,1]        CAAR[0,3]        CAAR[0,10]       CAAR[-3,3]       CAAR[-5,1]       CAAR[-10,1]
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Hypothesis 2: Consumer Discretionary and Services 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Energy, Consumer Staples,  
Healthcare, Telecommunications, Information Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p-value < .01, ** p-value <.05, * p-value <.1
                                                                                                                                 
CAAR group 1  (9 securities)   -1.09%           -1.15%           -1.90%           -1.22%           -0.25%            0.60%
Ptf CARs n 1 (9 securities)    -1.09%           -1.15%           -1.90%           -1.22%           -0.25%            0.60%
_RASSICP                       -0.15%           -0.03%            3.21%            2.02%            1.59%            2.14%
_SAREB                         -2.64%           -4.87%           -7.21%          -10.63%           -4.93%            1.95%
_ELEKTRA                       -0.67%           -0.49%           -3.97%           -1.37%           -3.20%           -6.03%
_HOTEL                         -4.67%***        -4.76%**         -4.98%           -2.62%           -3.58%           -4.26%
_ALSEA                          1.28%           -0.45%            3.09%           -1.17%            0.82%            4.93%
_HCITY                         -0.71%            3.15%           -0.90%           -3.87%            0.70%           -0.24%
_NEMAKA                         1.83%            2.85%           -3.14%            6.31%            2.05%            1.95%
_LIVEPOLC                       0.84%           -0.97%           -4.44%           -1.08%            1.76%            4.66%
_RASSINIA                      -4.89%**         -4.74%            1.25%            1.41%            2.54%            0.29%
SECURITY                      CAAR[0,1]        CAAR[0,3]        CAAR[0,10]       CAAR[-3,3]       CAAR[-5,1]       CAAR[-10,1]
*** p-value < .01, ** p-value <.05, * p-value <.1
                                                                                                             
_SITESB1   -1.50%           -1.76%           -3.05%           -1.89%           -0.62%            0.25%
                                                                                                             
_AMXL       0.30%           -2.02%           -4.67%           -1.83%            0.78%            0.89%
                                                                                                             
_LABB       2.13%           -1.00%           -1.63%           -1.05%            4.52%            5.09%
                                                                                                             
CAAR group 2  (12 securities)  -0.83% -0.68%  0.14%           -0.86%           -1.53%           -0.92%
Ptf CARs n 2 (12 securities)  -0.83% -0.68%   0.14%           -0.86%           -1.53%           -0.92%
_AC        -0.46%           -1.90%           -0.07%           -3.48%           -2.82%           -3.02%
_LACOMUBC   5.84%***         4.85%*           4.22%            7.65%**          8.88%**         11.02%**
_BIMBOA    -1.87%           -0.43%            0.37%           -3.82%           -4.47%           -2.06%
_SORIANAB  -2.06%           -1.72%           -2.37%           -0.59%            0.08%           -2.70%
_CHDRAUIB   0.21%           -1.72%           -0.79%           -1.96%           -1.21%           -1.46%
_KOFL      -2.01%           -2.52%           -2.39%           -2.91%           -2.14%           -2.40%
_WALMEX     1.15%            1.27%            3.66%            2.86%            2.49%            3.72%
_KIMBERA   -2.57%           -3.33%           -1.84%           -4.76%           -5.26%           -0.41%
_GRUMAB    -0.28%            2.13%            5.99%            2.03%           -3.27%           -3.04%
_LALAB     -2.67%           -2.88%           -7.59%           -4.49%           -2.11%           -5.58%
_HERDEZ    -3.26%           -1.76%            5.33%           -3.79%           -7.18%*          -4.49%
_BACHOCOB  -2.03%           -0.15%           -2.78%            3.00%           -1.35%           -0.68%
                                                                                                             
_IENOVA     0.56%            1.11%           -3.95%            1.20%            0.19%            1.33%
SECURITY  CAAR[0,1]        CAAR[0,3]        CAAR[0,10]       CAAR[-3,3]       CAAR[-5,1]       CAAR[-10,1]
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Appendix C:  The “estudy” command in STATA 
“Estudy” is a user-contributed command in the STATA statistical package that allows 
researchers to quickly and easily calculate abnormal returns using a ready-set template. While it 
is uncommon to provide the STATA code in the methodology section of an economic paper, in 
this particular case a brief description will prove insightful about the exact mechanics of the 
present analysis being discussed. 
The format for the most important elements and options of the code are the following: 
Logarithmic returns must be initially calculated from the raw daily closing-price data in order 
for the command to properly identify and calculate abnormal returns. 
Ln(Pricei,t/Pricei,t-1) 
The “estudy” command can handle as many variables as necessary, which can be divided into six 
distinct variable lists which separates the firms into different columns on the output table if 
desired. It then requires a timeseries date variable to control for time. 
Once the date variable has been determined and specified, specific periods across time called the 
event windows (lb/ub4) and estimation window (eswlbound/eswubound5) must be established. 
The event windows are the days directly surrounding the date of interest in the study. According 
to the authors of the command as well as Craig Mackinlay, smaller estimations generally give 
greater precision in their calculations. However, it can be useful to account for the days nearest 
to the event both before and after to capture the effects of information leaks (inside trading) in 
the former, and account for delays in market reaction time in the latter.  
The Modtype variable is used to determine which market index (indices) will be utilized along 
with the firm variables of interest in order to account for autocorrelation and cross-sectional 
correlation, which is absolutely necessary for accurately determining abnormal returns. 
                                                          
4 Lower Bounds/Upper Bounds 
5 Estimation Window Upper/Lower Bound 
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Individual stocks are heavily influenced by the performance of the market overall and therefore 
in order to isolate the individual effect of an information shock on specific firms, this covariation 
much be accounted for. The command can process the effects of a single market or a multi-factor 
model with several indices accounted for. This project will use a single market model, using the 
overall Bolsa Mexicana de Valores index as the aggregate control for calculating abnormal 
returns. 
Finally, and perhaps one of the most important features of the “estudy” command is the 
diagnosticstat option, which provides several variations of tests for statistical significance of the 
abnormal returns. The default command assumes normality in the distribution of the returns 
themselves. However, following initial Shapiro-Wilk normality tests, most firms showed non-
normal distributions and therefore this study will use the test for the statistical significance of 
abnormal returns proposed by Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen in 1991 and corrected for cross-
sectional autocorrelation by Kolari and Pynnӧnen in 2010. 
 
 
